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Abstract:  The purpose of this paper is to argue that free trade agreements do not necessarily improve 
trade between member countries. The effects of such agreements depend on the historical, 
political and ethnic circumstances in trading partner countries and the specifi cs of their 
relations.  The sample consists of panel data, which includes CEFTA member countries and 
their major trading partners for the period 1999-2007. Results of the gravity model suggest 
that trade liberalisation did not improve trade in the region for the observed period, when 
controlling for the other trade determinants. This fi nding may be a result of recent confl icts 
between the observed countries of the region. 
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Introduction
Conventional wisdom is that trade liberalisation leads to improved trade perform-
ances between countries through the mechanisms of trade creation and trade diver-
sion. The aim of this paper is to argue that the introduction of a free trade area may 
not necessarily have this effect, instead the outcome is dependent on the specifi c 
circumstances of member countries. Our fi ndings support the previous fi ndings of 
Yamarik and Ghosh (2005) and Subasat (2008). 
The impact of the free trade agreement on bilateral trade relations between 
CEFTA member countries is likely to refl ect not just economic but also political 
relations between countries of the region. Most of the current CEFTA member coun-
tries are Western Balkan countries that have specifi c political relations, which may 
potentially affect liberalization-trade relationship in unexpected directions (Bartlett, 
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2009). Although implementation only started in 2007, liberalization’s effect on trade 
may precede the formal signature of the agreement as CEFTA evolved from previous 
trade agreements between member countries. In the model below we seek to esti-
mate the impact of this liberalisation process on member countries’ trade.  
The Effect of Free Trade Agreements on International Trade
As trade policies between trading partners are believed to have a signifi cant impact 
on bilateral trade fl ows, variables which refl ect those policies are usually included 
in gravity model which estimate the determinants of trade fl ows between trading 
partners. In order to capture this effect it has become common in studies to include 
a dummy variable for free trade agreements in gravity models as a main feature of 
trade liberalisation. A common fi nding is that they appear to have signifi cant posi-
tive effect on bilateral trade fl ows (e.g. Baier and Bergstrand, 2009; Caporale et. al, 
2009). This positive effect is usually attributed to trade creation and trade diversion 
effects1. Though previous research on this topic is fairly conclusive, with results var-
ying in different studies from small positive (Micco et al., 2003; Blomqvist, 2004) to 
large positive effect (Adam et al., 2003, Rose, 2004) of trade liberalisation on trade 
fl ows this fi nding is not universal, especially when considering small and underde-
veloped countries like most of the current CEFTA member countries. Subasat (2008) 
argues that the relationship between trade liberalization and intensity of trade fl ows 
is not conclusive and that it depends on the sample specifi cs. Indeed, sensitivity 
analysis conducted by Yamarik and Ghosh (2005) suggests further caution about the 
supposed strong positive effect of FTA on trade than is the literature on this topic. 
They found that “trade creation result in most regional trading arrangements are 
not robust to changes in conditioning set of variables” (Yamarik and Ghosh, 2005, 
p.111). Therefore, they conclude that the effect of FTAs should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis. 
The effect of trade liberalisation on bilateral trade fl ows depends on countries’ 
potentials and capacities, especially where exports are concerned. Santos-Paulino 
(2004) notes that trade liberalisation usually has a positive effect on imports and 
exports, but that in developing countries it may worsen the balance of payment as in 
these countries imports are likely to rise faster than exports. Other important features 
that have to be considered and that can disturb the expected effect of trade liberalisa-
tion on bilateral trade fl ows are the historical and political circumstances and ethnic 
considerations in the countries which are liberalising their trade fl ows. These latter 
factors will be discussed in the context of CEFTA member countries in the next sec-
tion. 
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The Western Balkan Context
All CEFTA member countries, apart from Moldova, are Western Balkan countries 
which have had very turbulent economic and political histories. Until 1991 these 
countries were strongly connected as (with the exception of Albania) members of 
Yugoslavia2, but after its breakup wars and confl icts affected. The economic, politi-
cal and ethnic consequences of these confl icts persist, though these countries now 
share a common objective of EU accession.  
In 1999 the international community created the Stability Pact for South East-
ern European countries. Under the Stability Pact the EU launched the Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP). The SAP envisaged that each of the SEE countries 
would sign Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with EU. The Stability 
Pact also led to South East European countries (SEECs) signing a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) on trade liberalisation in 2001 which required formation 
of free trade area among SEECs. This was to be done by creation of a network 
of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) between countries - 31 agreements were 
signed by 2004 (see appendix 1). Bilateral FTAs have been criticised for creating a 
‘spaghetti bowl’ of differentiated trade relations which are likely to result in trade 
defl ection3 and trade diversion (Bartlett, 2009). Croatia has been a CEFTA member 
from 2003, while B&H, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, FRY Macedonia, Albania 
and Moldova joined in 2006 with implementation from the end of 2007. 
The arguments for creation of a free trade area among Western Balkan countries 
usually offered are: to encourage regional integration (to reconcile relations between 
confl icting countries); development of competitiveness of the region in the global 
(and especially EU) market as countries separately are too weak to compete and 
should benefi t from scale economies, which are supposed to result from increased 
regional integration and avoidance of potential adverse shocks from the EU (Bartlett, 
2009; Adam et al., 2003).
On the other side, there are a few complications regarding the process of liber-
alisation amongst Western Balkan countries which can be argued to lead towards 
a “complex and contradictory process of simultaneous integration and disintegra-
tion of the region” (Bartlett, 2009). Firstly, the EU required the Western Balkan 
countries to liberalize their trade among each other in order to sign SAAs and to 
engender regional cooperation conventions between themselves after signing4, but at 
he same time the European Union liberalised trade with the countries of the region 
unilaterally by using “Autonomous Trade Preferences” (ATPs) that allowed duty and 
quota-free access for the majority of SEEC exports5, which “cut across the region 
and disrupt their mutual (intra-CEFTA) trade relations” (Bartlett, 2009, p.25). This 
is also known as the “hub-and-spoke” problem. There is a threat that there will be no 
improvement in trade between SEE countries (“spoke”) that became CEFTA mem-
bers as the EU (“hub”) is also opening its market to these countries and it is likely 
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that CEFTA members will focus on the EU rather than the CEFTA market and will 
“end up being a set of small peripheral economies that are next to each other, rather 
than integrated with one another” (Christie, 2002, p.26). 
Trade liberalisation can negatively infl uence country’s balance of payment and 
consequently its economic performance if a country did not build its competitiveness 
before opening its economy. This has been a case for the less developed Western Bal-
kan countries (e.g. B&H, Kosovo) in the moment of their trade liberalisation, as they 
previously did not build capacities for their export improvements. Other obstacles to 
the development of trade (especially exports) in the region are: a lack of institutions 
(for quality control and certifi cation), weak linkages to international markets, poor 
transport infrastructures, poor quality institutions which appear to be major determi-
nants in the development process of the external sector (Fugazza, 2004). Other ob-
stacles include: the persistence of non-tariff barriers (long waiting time for getting a 
license and quotas imposed on imports); corruption among customs offi cials; lack of 
common technical regulations and standards; inadequate sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations, as well as an underdeveloped so-called backbone service sector, such as 
fi nancial intermediation, transport and telecommunications (Hadziomeragic et al., 
2007; Adam et al., 2003). 
All of these complications suggest that we could fi nd perverse signs on some 
variables in our model of trade fl ows estimated in the following section. As Bartlett 
(2009, p.44) argued:  
“The Balkan case indicates the potential unreadiness for trade liberalisation of 
Western Balkan countries and complexities of regional integration, and that in a 
politically and ethnically divided region, policies designed to promote regional 
economic cooperation may in practice have contradictory effects, opposed to 
those that were intended by their designers drawing on experience of more be-
nign environments.” 
Estimating Bilateral Trade Relations
The gravity model, which has been used for over 40 years for estimation of bilateral 
trade determinants, specifi es economic mass (national income) of the countries of in-
terest and the distance between them as major bilateral trade determinants. In the recent 
studies economists use an extended gravity model including other variables considered 
to be important determinants of international trade fl ows. There is no consensus on 
which variables to add as determinants of bilateral trade fl ows. Commonly used deter-
minants in recent studies are: regional trade agreements (Yamarik and Ghosh, 2005, 
Rose 2000, 2005), variability of exchange rate (Pugh et al, 1999; Clark et al, 2004), 
membership in institutions which promote trade (Rose, 2005, Engelbrecht and Pearce, 
2007) and the effects of border on trade (Anderson and Wincoop, 2003). 
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Other researchers have been trying to improve the gravity model by including 
additional variables such as population variables; dummy variables to account for 
shared characteristics between countries that are likely to induce or inhibit trade 
between them, such as dummy variables for common border, common language, 
membership in free trade agreements and institutions that promote trade (Clark et 
al., 2004) and monetary variables, such as exchange rate variability, currency union, 
foreign currency reserves (Kandogan, 2007). 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1988) tried to improve model by emphasizing the im-
portance of a shared history between countries in free trade areas, arguing that free 
trade agreements may be a result of previous connections and relations between 
countries. History can also affect trade through political, historical and economic cir-
cumstances from the past, such as wars, recessions, exchange rate shocks, affi liation, 
networks and other temporary or permanent changes that may have permanent effect 
on trade of observed countries (Anderson and Smith, 2007). In order to capture this 
effect they suggested inclusion of lagged dependent variable in the gravity model. 
Although Eichengreen and Irwin found evidence for hysteresis their addition was 
widely ignored in subsequent literature. If hysteresis is an important determinant of 
trade fl ows then many gravity models which did not take it into account suffer from 
a missing-variable bias (Anderson and Smith, 2007). On the other hand, inclusion of 
the lagged dependent variable may cause problems with estimation. As the lagged 
dependent variable is likely to be correlated with unobserved terms from the past, 
which are captured by the error term, the inclusion of the lagged dependent vari-
able is likely to induce a problem with endogeneity. However, recent developments, 
especially the introduction of dynamic panel estimation, enable this problem to be 
addressed. The change from cross-sectional data to time-series panels “has allowed 
the use of a lagged dependent variable, country fi xed effects for exporters and/or 
importers, log-fi rst-differences of variables, and estimations of time-varying regres-
sion parameters” (Schaefer et al., 2008, p.3). These potential problems regarding 
endogeneity, heterogeneity and omitted variable bias are addressed in the following 
analysis. 
Data and Sources
In an attempt to assess the impact of the CEFTA (and the previous network of free 
trade agreements between CEFTA countries) on the export performance of member 
countries we estimate a gravity model comprising of 20 countries for the period 
1999–2007. In addition to the seven CEFTA member countries (Kosovo is not in-
cluded becuase of a lack of data) are 13 countries which are the main exporting part-
ners of the CEFTA member countries and capture virtually all the export markets for 
the CEFTA member countries.
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Most of the data for bilateral trade fl ows are taken from the International Mon-
etary Fond DOTS (Director of Trade Statistics) database. Some data were not avail-
able in DOTS database (for Montenegro and Serbia for some years) and were ob-
tained from national statistics. Data for nominal GDP, GDP per capita and CPI index 
(used for calculation of real exchange rate) are taken from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators database (apart for CPI for Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Montenegro which are taken from national statistics, and adjusted to the base year 
2000). Bilateral exchange rates between countries are calculated through using the 
exchange rate of each national currency in respect to dollar at the end of the year 
(usually on the last day of the year) which is taken from UN database (http://www.
un.org/depts/treasury, Accessed 15 July 2009). For countries which used their own 
currencies before adopting the euro, their national currency is transformed to euros 
(for the period before its adoption) in order to be comparable (to avoid large changes 
in exchange rates which are due to the introduction of a new currency rather than 
real change in exchange rates) using the offi cial rates of national currency and euro 
on the day of conversion. The exchange rate is expressed as units of domestic (ex-
porter’s) currency for a unit of foreign (importer’s) currency. Distance is calculated 
by using great circle distance between capitals of observed countries by using the 
calculator on http://www.marinewaypoints.com/learn/greatcircle.shtml (Accessed 
17 July 2009). Data on the dates of bilateral free trade agreements signed between 
CEFTA member countries (before joining CEFTA) are taken from the Stability Pact 
for South Eastern Europe website (see appendix 1). All data are expressed in nomi-
nal terms, apart from the exchange rate which is in real terms as we are interested in 
the effect of real changes of exchange rate variability on trade. All data are expressed 
in dollars. 
As the dependent variable export fl ows are considered. The exports are used 
rather than imports because most of the studies on international trade examine the 
effect of exports on trade fl ows (Matyas, 1997; Cheng and Wall, 2005; Anderson 
and Smith, 2007) and because it refl ects countries’ growth potentials and produc-
tive capacities.
Empirical Results
The review of theoretical and empirical research above founds that some studies 
included the lag dependent variable in their estimations and some did not. In our 
analysis, as suggested by Schaefer et al. (2008), results from both static and dynamic 
model will be presented.
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Static model
As suggested by Cheng and Wall (2005) and Adam et al. (2003) the most appropri-
ate static model specifi cation is a model with country-pair and time fi xed effects6. As 
all variables in the gravity equation are constructed as measures of country i relative 
to country j it seems natural to assume that the specifi c effect is also expressed as 
a measure of country i to country j (Adam et al., 2003). In other words, each cross 
section in our panel represents a different bilateral fl ow. 
This model specifi cation addresses the problem of heterogeneity between coun-
try-pairs (which may be the result of previous relations between countries) by inclu-
sion of trade-pair fi xed effects, hence removing the country-pair specifi c time-in-
variant variables, such as distance, common border, common language (the model 
used by Cheng and Wall, 2005). Time fi xed effects are also included in the model to 
control for time-specifi c factors such as world business cycles and global shocks as 
well as variables of our interest (equation 1).
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| is absolute difference between two countries’ per capita GDPs, which 
should capture Linder effect (an underlying rationale of the Linder effect is: the 
closer the per capita incomes of two countries are there will be more (intra-indus-
try) trade between them); lnERV
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 is standard deviation of annual changes in the 
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 are dummy variables which are 1 if both trading partners are 
EU (EMU) member countries in period t; ε
ijt
 is normally distributed error term and 
A is a constant term.
The signifi cance of the model with group (country-pair) and time fi xed effects is 
tested by a standard F-test and the null hypothesis that included variables (most of 
which are country-pair fi xed effects) are signifi cantly equal to zero is rejected at all 
conventional levels (Appendix 2). Moreover, autocorrelation between residuals is 
tested by using the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data which generates 
a test statistic to compare with critical values and thus enables formal hypothesis 
testing (Appendix 3). The null hypothesis that there is no fi rst-order autocorrela-
tion is on the border line of rejection at 5% signifi cance level (p-value 0.0458). As 
autocorrelation is not too high it is possible to interpret the estimated coeffi cients as 
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giving economic meaning, because they might potentially be expected to be unbi-
ased and consistent in respect to residual autocorrelation. According to the results of 
two-way fi xed effect model7 with robust standard errors8 (Appendix 2) only two vari-
ables are signifi cant: the product of GDPs of countries and variable that is supposed 
to capture the Linder effect. Both of these have a positive effect on exports indicat-
ing that the higher the income of countries is the higher the exports from country i 
to country j will be and exports between countries from the sample are likely to be 
higher the more different countries are (although we expected the sign on Linder ef-
fect to be negative). The exchange rate variable has a positive but insignifi cant effect. 
The effect of CEFTA is positive but also insignifi cant, while the effect of free trade 
agreements between CEFTA member countries is negative and insignifi cant (for sign 
and size of coeffi cients see table 1). 
Table 1. Estimated coeffi cients from the preferred static (two-way fi xed effects) 
model 


























Note: ***, **, * donates that variables are statistically signifi cant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
However, as argued above this static model might be misspecifi ed as it does not 
include any infl uences from the past which may have signifi cant effects on depend-
ent variable. There are also some variables that might affect the dependent as well 
as independent variables and some variables (free trade agreement) might be en-
dogenous, which are not accounted for in the static estimation and which may make 
our estimates biased and seriously undermine the validity of the estimation results. 
Moreover, as mentioned above the autocorrelation is on the border line.
Dynamic model
Eichengreen and Irwin (1998, p.56) concluded that they would “never run another 
gravity model equation that excludes lagged trade fl ows” and since some of the 
recent studies have included the lagged dependent variable in the gravity model we 
have also estimated the model with the lagged dependent variable in order to test for 
signifi cance of any “history effect”.
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A dynamic model, which simply adds a lagged dependent variable (which cap-
tures the effect of history on trade) to the original “Newtonian” specifi cation, is 
estimated (equation 2). 
lnEXP
ijt
 = A + b
0



































ij                                                   
(2)
All General Method of Moments (GMM) techniques for estimating dynamic 
panel models are suitable for panels with large cross section (N) and short time 
series (T) which is relatively the case with our sample (20 countries and 7 years of 
data). Dynamic panel estimators require as few as three periods of data to be us-
able, although ‘four or more will be preferable’ (Greene, 2007, E11-83, as cited in 
Pugh, 2009). The motivation for dynamic panel is to overcome the above mentioned 
limitations of static panel analysis. Other advantages of GMM are that distributional 
assumptions, such as normality, are not required and that enables us to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity of the same individuals over time (Verbeek, 2000, as cited 
in Pugh, 2009). 
The results of the “system” GMM can be interpreted as the diagnostics are satis-
factory: p-value of Hansen test is 0.494 (which is above Roodman’s rule of thumb 
threshold of p=0.25). Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in fi rst differences is also satis-
fi ed (hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation is “accepted” at conventional 
levels), although test for AR(1) is only satisfi ed at 10% signifi cance level. The “dif-
ference-in-Hansen” test is suggesting that differenced instruments for level equa-
tions are valid, indicating that the “system” GMM is preferable over the “difference” 
GMM model9 (Appendix 5). According to results of the “system” GMM estimates 
(Appendix 5) the lagged dependent variable (lnexp L1) is highly signifi cant and posi-
tive indicating that the effect of history (past relations between two countries) on 
current exports is important, implying that dynamic specifi cation is likely to be more 
comprehensive than the static one. The lagged dependent variable suggests that the 
current level of exports will be 65% of the previous year10 level of exports irrespec-
tive of the current value of the independent variables. Moreover, all variables which 





- lndist, common border - combrd and common language - comlang) are signifi cant 
and have the expected signs in this dynamic specifi cation. According to the results, 
holding other factors constant: if GDPs of trading partners (i and j) increase for 1% 
exports from country i to country j will increase for 0.3%; if distance between coun-
tries i and j increases for 1% exports from country i to country j will decrease for 
0.42%; if countries i and j share the border exports from country i to country j is by 
26.21%11 higher than for countries which do not have same border; if the same lan-
guage is spoken in countries i and j exports from country i to country j is by 36.26% 
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higher than export between countries in which the language spoken is not the same. 
The Linder effect now has a negative sign (contrary to the sign in the static model) 
which is consistent with our expectations. The exchange rate (ER) variability varia-
ble again did not pass robustness checks and is insignifi cant when time dummies are 
included. One possible reason for this insignifi cance of ER variability is that there is 
no control for different ER regimes. However, there is no consensus on the impact of 
ER regimes on exports. The free trade agreement variable appears as signifi cant (at 
the 10% level) and negative, indicating that when both trading partners are members 
of pre-CEFTA network of free trade agreements exports from country i to country 
j is by 29.73% lower than if one or both were not members. This result may be a 
consequence of the political situation in the region and trade diversion from the 
region towards the EU market as a result of the Autonomous Trade Preferences dis-
cussed above. The CEFTA variable is negative as well, but insignifi cant. Estimated 
coeffi cients and signifi cance of the variables from the preferred dynamic model are 
presented in table 2 (results are from the two-step robust ‘xtabond2’ estimation12). 
Table 2. Estimated coeffi cients from the “system” GMM estimation 






























Note: ***, **, * donates that variables are statistically signifi cant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Conclusion
In the recent gravity literature there is no consensus about the variables that should 
be included in the gravity model or about the method of estimation which is likely 
to provide the most appropriate results when estimating the bilateral trade determi-
nants. In this paper alternative specifi cations were estimated and the dynamic model 
estimated by “system” GMM appears as the preferred one (according to diagnostic 
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tests and signifi cance of the lagged dependent variable). We think that the “history” 
effect cannot be directly captured by the fi xed effects (as noted in some studies) and 
that inclusion of lagged dependent variable, when dynamics are present, is important 
in order to get unbiased estimates. Furthermore, it is important to treat free trade 
agreements variables as endogenous as they may be a result, as well as a source, of 
potentially higher trade between countries, which can be done by GMM estimation. 
All variables which are commonly included in the model appear as signifi cant in 
our preferred specifi cation and have expected signs – income, common border and 
common language have positive effects on exports while distance has a negative 
effect, ceteris paribus. The exchange rate variability variable did not turn out to be 
signifi cant and did not pass robustness checks and, therefore, we cannot make any 
inference about sign and size of the estimated coeffi cient on this variable. The vari-
able for free trade agreements between CEFTA countries appears to be signifi cant 
and has a negative effect on exports. This result suggests that the conventional wis-
dom that trade liberalisation leads to improved trade performances between member 
countries does not apply in the case of CEFTA. A fi nding which supports the argu-
ment of Yamarik and Ghosh (2005) that rather than assuming benefi cial results, the 
effect of each FTA needs to be analysed on a case by case basis. Given the unique 
recent history of the Western Balkans we do not fi nd these results surprising. The 
absence of positive trade effects should not be interpreted as a criticism of the crea-
tion of CEFTA since there are also potential political and institutional benefi ts from 
such a process. It does however suggest that the anticipated economic benefi ts of this 
agreement may have been exaggerated. 
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NOTES
1 Trade creation is present when imports (which are cheaper after signing FTA) replace (more ex-
pensive) domestic production. Trade diversion occurs when country lowers its imports from the third 
country and increase imports of the same goods from countries from free trade area (because they are 
cheaper in those countries due to absence of tariffs on goods imported from free trade area).
2  Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia resign Yugolavia in 1991, B&H in 1992, Montenegro in 2006 and 
Kosovo in 2008.
3  “Trade defl ection can arise when, in the absence of effectively implemented rules of origin, the 
country with the lowest external tariffs is likely to serve as an entry point into its partner’s market (with 
higher tariffs) for the goods originating in non-member countries” (Hadziomeragic, 2007, p. 77). 
4  The EU signed SAAs with Macedonia and Croatia in 2001 which eventually came into force in 2004. 
SAAs have also been signed with Albania in 2006, with Montenegro in 2007, and with Serbia, and Bos-
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nia and Herzegovina, in 2008. Kosovo, which declared its independence in February 2008, is the only 
Western Balkan country which has not yet signed an SAA with the EU (Bartlett, 2008, p. 27).
5  In 2000, the EU granted ATPs to all the Western Balkans allowing nearly all exports to enter the EU 
without customs duties or limits on quantities. Only wine, sugar, baby beef and certain fi sheries prod-
ucts enter the EU under preferential tariff quotas. These preferences, which were renewed in 2005 until 
2010, have contributed to an increase in the Western Balkans’ exports to the EU by approximately 8% 
per year. In 2007, the EU was the region’s largest trading partner for both imports (61.3%) and exports 
(63.2%) 
(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/balkans/ - website accessed on 2 July 2009).
6  Estimates and diagnostics for the other static model specifi cations are available on demand
7  Hausman specifi cation test was performed in STATA 10 (Appendix 4). The respective p-value is 
0.0000 and thus the null hypothesis that the random effects estimator is consistent is soundly rejected. 
Consequently, we can conclude that the fi xed effects estimator is the more appropriate specifi cation 
than random effects estimator.
8  All reported results include robust standard errors as it is suggested to rely on those results as those 
are corrected for potential heteroscedasticity. Baum (2006, p.137) also notes that in large dataset it has 
become increasingly common to report results using the robust estimator of the VCE.
9  Estimates and diagnostics for the “difference” GMM and estimates of different specifi cations (with 
different number of instruments used) are available on demand.
10  To control for persistance effect one lag of dependent variable is enough as focus of the study was 
not on the persisatnce effect as such. Also, in StataCorp (2007, p.96) it is suggested to use one lag of 
dependent variable as “the moment conditions using higher lags are redundant”.
11  Percentage changes in the predicted y for dummy variables are calculated by formula 100*[exp( ) 
- 1] (see Wooldridge, 2006, p.238).
12  “… ‘xtabond2’, unlike ‘xtabond’, makes available a fi nite-sample correction to the two-step covari-
ance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2000). This can make two-step robust more effi cient than one-step 
robust, especially for system GMM” (Stata help for ‘xtabond2’). Robust standard errors are used to 
correct for heterogeneity (which is usually present in the panel data). 
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Appendix 2 – Fixed effect model (with time dummies and cpair fi xed effects) 
– robust SE (the preferred static model)
. xi: xtreg  lnexp lngdpij linder sdlrerd lndist combrd comlang cefta ftacefta eu emu 
i.time, fe i(cpair) vce(robust)
i.time                   _Itime_1999-2007    (naturally coded; _Itime_1999 omitted)
Fixed-effects (within) regression                Number of obs       =       2130
Group variable: cpair                            Number of groups =        380
R-sq: within  = 0.1876      Obs per group: min =          1
 between = 0.4854                                                                                               avg =        5.6
        overall = 0.4788                                                                                                max = 6
                                                 F(12,1738)          =     126.17
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3366                         Prob > F            =     0.0000
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on cpair)
                                                                                Robust
 lnexp Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
 lngdpij   .9553635     .124779      7.66    0.000      .7106306     1.200096
 linder .4559839 .1175453 3.88 0.000 .2254389 686529
 sdlrerd .0295944 .1662344  0.18 0.859 -.296446 .3556348
 lndist   (dropped)
 combrd   (dropped)
 comlang   (dropped)
 cefta   .1598377 .2745519 0.58 0.561 -.3786492 .6983246
 ftacefta -.1609966 .2312902 -0.70 0.486 -.6146331 .2926398
 eu    .0496353    .0360995      1.37    0.169     -.0211678     .1204384
 emu   .1166456    .0875046      1.33    0.183     -.0549798      .288271
 _Itime_2000   (dropped)
 _Itime_2001   (dropped)
 _Itime_2002      .29757    .1532879      1.94    0.052      -.003078     .5982181
 _Itime_2003   .1419365    .1013963      1.40    0.162     -.0569351     .3408082
 _Itime_2004    .0726453    .0733901      0.99    0.322     -.0712969     .2165875
 _Itime_2005   -.0250932    .0796678     -0.31    0.753     -.1813481     .1311618
 _Itime_2006    .1110126    .0554993      2.00    0.046      .0021602      .219865
 _Itime_2007   (dropped)
 _cons   -30.18423    6.419053     -4.70    0.000     -42.77411    -17.59435
      sigma_u   2.5506078
      sigma_e    .85520669
          rho    .8989387           (fraction of variance due to u_i)
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Appendix 3 - Xtserial – testing for residual autocorrelation 
. xtserial lnexp lngdpij linder sdlrerd lndist combrd comlang cefta ftacefta eu emu  
year2000 year2001 year2002 year20
> 03 year2004 year2005 year2006 year2007
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
 H0: no fi rst-order autocorrelation
     F(  1,     348) =       4.016
 Prob > F =       0.0458
Appendix 4 – Hausman test 
   . hausman fi xed random
                                                                     ---- Coeffi cients ----
  (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                  fi xed random Difference S.E.
      lngdpij     9553635      .9949944        -.0396309         .1526765
       linder     .4559839      .0180715         .4379125         .1448401
   sdlrerd     .0295944      .0772784         -.047684         .0332445
        cefta     .1598377      .1244753         .0353624         .0174328
     ftacefta    -.1609966     -.2461777         .0851811         .0176624
           eu     .0496353     -.0279306         .0775659         .0209395
          emu     .1166456 -.0814321 .1980777 .1557844
  _Itime_2003     .1419365     -.1849549         .3268915        .1795995
  _Itime_2004     .0726453     -.2760845         .3487298         .1154668
  _Itime_2005    -.0250932     -.3984172          .373324         .0828604
  _Itime_2006     .1110126     -.2957068         .4067194         .0371407
  b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, effi cient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
          Test:  Ho: difference in coeffi cients not systematic
 chi2(11) =  (b-B)’[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
  =       73.26
 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                            (V_b-V_B is not positive defi nite)
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Appendix 5 – “system” GMM estimated with xtabond2, with minimum instru-
ments, but not collapsed (treating cefta and ftacefta as endogenous) 
(the preferred dynamic model)
. xi: xtabond2 lnexp L.lnexp lngdpij linder sdlrerd lndist combrd comlang cefta 
ftacefta eu emu i.time, gmm(L.lnexp, laglimits(1 1)) gmm(ftacefta cefta, laglimits
(2 2)) iv(lngdpij linder sdlrerd lndist combrd comlang eu emu i.time) two robust
i.time            _Itime_1999-2007    (naturally coded; _Itime_1999 omitted)
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm.
_Itime_2000 dropped due to collinearity
_Itime_2001 dropped due to collinearity
_Itime_2007 dropped due to collinearity
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular.
Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation.
Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative.
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
Group variable : cpair                            Number of obs       =       2093
Time variable  : time                             Number of groups    =        380
Number of instruments = 43  Obs per group: min  =          1
Wald chi2(16)  =   7476.67                                                                avg  =       5.51
Prob > chi2    =     0.000                                                               max  =          6
                                                                 Corrected
 lnexp        Coef.    Std. Err.       z     P>|z|      [95%  Conf. Interval]
        lnexp
 L1.    .6476753    .1174671 5.51 0.000 .417444     .8779065
      lngdpij   .2889787    .1044579      2.77    0.006      .0842449     .4937124
       linder  -.0986999    .0464431     -2.13    0.034     -.1897268    -.0076731
      sdlrerd   .2531785    .1627105      1.56    0.120     -.0657281     .5720852
       lndist  -.4240023   .1486736     -2.85    0.004     -.7153972    -.1326074
       combrd   .2327617    .1080895      2.15    0.031      .0209101     .4446133
      comlang   .3094208    .1499529      2.06    0.039      .0155186      .603323
        cefta   -.133595    .1873821     -0.71    0.476     -.5008571     .2336672
     ftacefta  -.3528664    .2147847    -1.64    0.100     -.7738367     .0681039
           eu -.1236696    .0620561     -1.99    0.046     -.2452973    -.0020419
          emu  -.0659344    .0768943     -0.86    0.391     -.2166446     .0847757
  _Itime_2002  -.0164873    .0522292     -0.32    0.752     -.1188546       .08588
  _Itime_2003   .0213511   .0293885      0.73    0.468     -.0362493     .0789516
  _Itime_2004   .0597311    .0259287      2.30    0.021      .0089117     .1105504
 _Itime_2005 -.0213723    .0265308     -0.81    0.420     -.0733717     .0306271
  _Itime_2006  .0443178    .0298477      1.48    0.138     -.0141826     .1028183
        _cons  -4.674977    2.168236    -2.16    0.031     -8.924642    -.4253117
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Instruments for fi rst differences equation
  Standard
    D.(lngdpij linder sdlrerd lndist combrd comlang eu emu _Itime_2000
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006
    _Itime_2007)
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)
    L.L.lnexp
    L2.(ftacefta cefta)
Instruments for levels equation
  Standard
    _cons
    lngdpij linder sdlrerd lndist combrd comlang eu emu _Itime_2000
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006
    _Itime_2007
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)
    D.L.lnexp
    DL.(ftacefta cefta)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in fi rst differences: z =  -1.64  Pr > z =  0.102
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in fi rst differences: z =   0.66  Pr > z =  0.512
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(26)   = 220.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(26)   =  25.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.494
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  GMM instruments for levels
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =   7.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.841
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  18.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.198
  gmm(L.lnexp, lag(1 1))
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(15)   =  16.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.347
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =   8.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.631
  gmm(ftacefta cefta, lag(2 2))
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   5.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.677
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  19.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.349
  iv(lngdpij linder sdlrerd lndist combrd comlang eu emu _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 
_Itime_2004 _I
> time_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007)
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  14.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.310
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  10.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.654

